Friday 25 December 2015

From the Executive Board

Dear Delegates,

We are pleased to welcome you to the fourth edition of Axel Model United Nations (AXMUN)
The topics under discussion for the conference are-
·         Legalization of gay marriage and LGBT rights (HRC)
·          Fourth Generation Warfare in the Middle East (DISEC)
·         Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts (SPC)

The topics at hand are ones very relevant to today’s world. It is very important that you along with the other delegates of the committee come together to debate solutions to the agendas mentioned above.
But delegates please note, will the topic might seem simple, we expect all of you to go into detail of every aspect of the agenda, leaving no stone unturned.
In your approach to any agenda, we would like you to think creatively, strategically and most importantly, diplomatically. The decision process will be intensive but the actions taken will have extensive implications for all the nations. Any actions take will have to be taken bearing in mind that they could have a subsequent effect of future policies. From each one of you exemplary diplomacy is expected. This includes diplomatic courtesy, effective lobbying and compromising on reasonable grounds.  However, the members of the committee must not restrict their research to mere introductions of the agenda. Each of you must maintain the decorum and required level of

Research that is expected from the Executive Board. This research need not be restricted to one’s country, but also to other nations present within the committee, as such research helps to keep the flow of debate intense and also helps understand each countries relationship with one another.
We would also like everyone to prepare topics for Moderated Caucus as we feel that breaking up the main agenda into sub-agendas can be used effectively in finding solutions for the agenda. This topic can have numerous moderated caucus topics so please make sure we as a committee, cover them all.
Please bear in mind that there are only two days to resolve this issue and we would like all delegates to take part in forming a resolution and having it passed.
We look forward to all the ideas you have and the high quality of debate that will take place. However, what is most important is that you make sure you have fun during the conference! If you have any questions at all, please do not hesitate to contact us!
We wish you all the best for your preparation for the Conference and hope that your AXMUN experience exceeds your expectation! J
Sincerely,
The Executive Board

Naina Catherine (Chair of DISEC)
Aveeva Saikia (Chair of SPC)
Ayanabh Hazarika (Chair of HRC)

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Topic Guide for DISEC

AGENDA: FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Introduction to the Body
Welcome to the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC)! Formally known as “The First Committee of the General Assembly,” DISEC is in charge of the establishment and
maintenance of international peace and security. As the First Committee, DISEC is often tasked with solving the world’s most important problems. The committee is composed of representatives from all member states of the United Nations, who are each given one vote to emphasize equality in all decisions. Its mandate, stated clearly in Article 26
of the United Nations Charter, is to “promote the establishment and maintenance of international
peace and security with the least diversion.” DISEC discusses topics such as arms control, conflict resolution, and nuclear disarmament. However, due to constantly evolving technology, the content discussed in committee is rapidly expanding into new topics such as cyber warfare. Unlike the Security Council (UNSC), DISEC is not allowed to impose any kind of sanctions on a nation, nor can it dictate a member’s actions.
Under these restrictions, DISEC constitutes a global forum that can construct internationally representative recommendations to states and other agencies, providing a concise picture of the global opinion when dealing with issues of extreme importance.
Debating the topics at hand, you will have the opportunity to propose and fine-tune your
country’s stances on the world’s most important issues. However, your committee resolutions are the backbone of this conference, and you are expected to address the current topics in accordance with the goals of DISEC.
Please use this background guide as a beginning to your research in both topics up for discussion. When researching, remember the context in which you will be debating these issues, as well as the structure of DISEC. This is a forum to bring new, innovative ideas, and to think critically about big picture problems.








Statement of the Issue
Fourth-generation warfare is often initiated by
the “weaker” party, or the group with less traditional resources and power. This new form of warfare often has major similarities with traditional low-intensity conflict, particularly in regards to guerrilla warfare tactics. Fourth-generation warfare proves to be detrimental to international cooperation efforts, as it is often characterized by violent non-state actors
that act in a similar role to traditional states. While some of the motivations and rationale
have remained consistent throughout the evolution of warfare, tactics have changed drastically in response to today’s environment. Often executed by non-state parties that lack a center of political gravity, fourth generation warfare is highly motivated by religion, nationalism, and family honor. Insurgency on political, social, and economic fronts has become a powerful weapon in today’s evolving concept of war. Furthermore, fourth-generation warfare can include
cyber terrorism in cases of state-to-state conflict. When escalated, cyber terrorism can greatly impact the safety, quality of life, and privacy of civilians.

 Experts describe this new “fourth generation” as being widely dispersed and difficult to define, leading to new challenges on how to guide international warfare standards. It is imperative to identify these generational changes, in hopes of avoiding catastrophic civilian consequences.

History
Before delving into the history of fourth generation warfare, it is important to note the
line of progress of modern warfare throughout the “generations,” or qualitative shifts of both
technology and ideas.

First Generation
War experts define first generation warfare as tactics of “line and column and man power”
The line maximized firepower, given the weapons of the time and column response to the low training levels of troops.3 Hierarchy and discipline among soldiers was emphasized in top-down, tightly ordered structures. In this generation, distinguishing factors such as a strong culture, uniforms, and rank clearly separated the military from civilians. Lind describes this generation of warfare as emerging during the Thirty Year’s War, as the challenges of the time forced the states to organize and conduct their own troops in order to protect the wellbeing
of the state. Previously, warfare was conducted on a much smaller scale (i.e. by families, tribes, religious groups, etc.). Over time, and notably with the Peace of Westphalia, the state established a virtual monopoly on warfare activities.4 The first generation of war also created a distinction by highlighting the use of military force through armies and navies, and deemphasizing tactics like bribery and assassination. Direct line of fire was also a commonly used method of conducting war.

Second Generation
The second generation of warfare developed in the early stages of World War I, and put a greater emphasis on firepower and weapons than on sheer manpower. The transition stemmed from the development of weapons like machine guns, which made the first generation methods of war effectively obsolete. Furthermore, weapon technology was developed on a massive scale by the industrialized economies of individual states. With this, a new method of war emerged: the battle of warfare materials.5
Most notably, WWI saw the first instances of indirect, linear fire and movement. The defensive
methods put a focus on laterally dispersed line advances, with execution by small groups.6
However, it is important to note that an emphasis on order within the military still remained, particularly in regards to formation. The goal of this generation was attrition; as described by the French, “the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies.”7 This created firepower that was synchronized and plan oriented. Soldiers also welcomed an emphasis on order because it preserved the culture of discipline and even with the evolution of war.

Third Generation
Developed by the Germans during the end of WWI, the third generation of warfare placed and emphasis on using distance and depth between troops as a method of defense and strategy. Thus, this generation was the first to utilize truly nonlinear tactics. Additionally, armies put a strong emphasis on tactics of infiltration to bypass and collapse its
enemy. This also created a shift in military culture from outward (focused on the situation and enemy) to inward (focused on the process and method). Orders emphasized the ends, but not necessarily the means, creating a culture that valued initiative as
much as obedience. Technological progress came in the development of tanks. Technological change also created an operational shift, most famously in the form of blitzkrieg. Blitzkrieg took the main objective from place to time while emphasizing qualitative maneuvers over quantitative fire; it drastically shortened the decision making window of opponents.

As is evident in earlier generational shifts, evolution is driven by growing emphases on and
development of a few key ideas. Trends through the generational shifts have shown four consistent drivers of change. The first is the evolution of mission orders, with each generation becoming more and more disperse on the battlefield, and efforts becoming increasingly divided into smaller groups for greater flexibility in attacks. Another driver is the decreasing dependence on centralized logistics. This allows troops to put more emphasis on time, and possess a greater ability to live off the land of the enemy. The next driver is an emphasis on maneuvers. This puts less importance on sheer number of the troops, and more importance of smaller groups. These groups are harder to detect and are highly adaptive. The last driver is the shift in focus toward the enemy’s internal operations. This particular shift is very important in the transition from third to fourth generations. It illustrates the growing importance of understanding the strategic
centers of an opponent, and gaining the support of the people in these centers.9
Throughout the history of war, three elements have remained consistent. According to Professor
Martin van Creveld, there is a “holy trinity” of Western war-making, consisting of the state, the people, and the army.10 Fourth-generation warfare blurs the distinctions between these three. The use of fourth-generation-like warfare can be traced back to the Cold War. In this time period, there was less emphasis on traditional forms of war such as linear fire, bombers, machine guns, etc., and more emphasis on “war” through colonization. Major powers turned their focus to acquiring and maintaining colonies that would practice their ideologies. The most notable executor of this strategy was, of course, the Soviet Union, with its Soviet satellite states. The Cold war saw the dissemination of widespread propaganda, secrecy and the creation of fear among citizens to be used as a force against opposing powers. Since battlefields in their traditional forms did not exist, public opinion became essential. When the Soviet Union collapsed, so did the realistic possibility of another nation challenging the United States in conventional conflict. Thus, the concept of fourth-generation warfare evolved further.12 Unconventional war has proven to be very effective in combating established powers worldwide, most notably in the Iranian revolution, the Hezbollah campaign in South Lebanon, the Algerian war of Independence, and the Sandinista struggle in Nicaragua. Regardless of whether the insurgents achieve a true “victory,” unconventional warfare has proven to be a major
catalyst for political, economic, and social change in the territories involved.13

Current Situation and relevant International Action
The theory of fourth generation warfare can be tracked to the 1980’s work of
William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightingale, Captain John F.Schmitt, Colonel Joseph W. Sutton, and Lieutenant Col Gary I. Wilson in the Marine Corps Gazette.14The primary tenet is a return to the world of cultures, and not necessarily that of specific states in conflict. This ultimately leads to a crisis for countries like the United States, in determining the legitimacy of the state. In some cases, when counter insurgencies are led by foreign troops, it makes the state’s crisis of
legitimacy much worse.15 The fourth generation of warfare creates a “new class of international force”- the non-state actor.16 With the state losing the monopoly on war, the road is paved for groups such as Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, Hamas, and Hezbollah to exercise great influence. The violent nonstate actors (VNSAs)17 are able to act with great mobility, as they are not concerned with protecting their territory, but rather are primarily interested in spreading their respective ideologies. Because of the methods involved in fourth generation warfare some experts say that traditional superpowers are actually at a disadvantage on operational, strategic, mental and even moral levels. There is a heightened emphasis on concurrent actions within both the opponent’s physical and societal entities, coupled with the blurring of distinctions between military members and civilians.
Additionally, elements that gave superpowers advantages in past generations, such as large
headquarters for troops and fixed communication sites, have become obsolete, and even detriments, to the needs of fourth generation battle. These features create too great of a risk to the total functionality of the mission within the scope of these warfare developments. Guerrilla warfare of any kind prevents the possibility of striking an opponent’s
headquarters, forcing countries to rethink previously successful wartime strategies. Former superpowers, however, have struggled with this new system, most notably the US and France in Vietnam, and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.19 With fourth generation warfare, the key is to “apply force to an enemy without giving him a point at which to carry out a decisive counter-strike.”20 This viewpoint is radically different from the traditional approaches of major European powers and the United States, forcing these states to adopt new war philosophies,
and defend against evolving types of combat. The development of technology is both an asset and a liability in fourth-generation warfare.
Advancements in robotics, artificial intelligence, and drones allow for more developed war tactics, potentially leaving enemies crippled. However, these weapons have had challenges in combat, as they are easy to counter and are often too complex. Because of the precision that today’s technology allows, especially from remote locations, target selection has become much more important to isolate the enemy. A key to success in fourth-generation warfare could be “losing to win.” The West has been at the center of warfare for centuries, because the rest of the world has been forced to adopt their strategies to fight effectively. Recently, a monumental shift has taken place. Terrorism is much more about where and when to execute an attack, while utilizing relatively little firepower. Terrorists have been successful in the past by attempting to collapse target-states from within, using a state’s freedom and openness against itself to wage an ideological battle.

Major powers have faced challenges when occupying territories in which much of the
population resists occupation. This was most notably seen in the United States’ involvement in
Iraq and Afghanistan. It is widely believed that the US inadvertently created a breeding ground for terrorists and opened the door for fourth-generation warfare by establishing a declining, relatively weak Afghani state.21

To be successful, many experts say that superpowers must learn to fight “battles of
encirclement,” by having an infantry that can move farther and faster on foot than the enemy’s. Another strategy is attempting to assimilate into local cultures preserve the current state, notably attempted in the US conflicts with Iraq and Afghanistan. Subnational groups are in a particularly interesting position, as they can either be enemies or allies to established powers within a region. They can demonstrate allegiance to whichever party appeases them, thus putting them in a position of flexibility and dangerous ambiguity. Furthermore, terrorist groups deemphasize the power of order to help improve their speed and flexibility in attack. Even the defining factors of fourth-generation warfare are still evolving in the present day. For example, Thomas Hammes recently noted that “insurgent campaigns have shifted from military campaigns supported by information operations to strategic communications campaigns supported by guerrilla and terrorist operations.”22

Case Study: Recruitment for Al-Qaeda and ISIS
Al-Qaeda was one of the first to implement online terrorist activity in the form of propaganda, military instruction videos, and other informational videos. This is considered a form of low-intensity military effort referred to as “netwar.” 23 Notably, these materials are translated into multiple languages to reach a larger audience. Extremist groups have used platforms such as blogs, message boards, and email as sources for quick dispersion of materials
and indoctrination, with some groups even creating “social media like hubs for extremists intent on becoming the next generation of terrorists, hijackers, and even suicide bombers.”24 These materials have been coined as “bedroom jihad” by war analysts due to their easy accessibility and integration into potential recruits’ lives.25 Many groups have compiled data on individuals to facilitate recruitment, which is a necessity for the sustainability of their respective movements. al-Qaeda in particular had become so good at their online propaganda, that former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted “It is embarrassing that al-Qaeda is better at communicating its message on the Internet than America…speed, agility, and cultural relevance are not terms that come readily to mind when discussing US strategic communications.”26 In 2009, a copy of A Course in the Art of Recruiting was recovered by United States in Iraq. The pamphlet went into
detail about strategies for the recruitment of new al-Qaeda members, particularly foreigners. A key strategy was to spend as much time with, and listen carefully to, a prospective recruit to understand their life and “share his joys and sadness.” The pamphlet also instructed recruiters to instill the basics of Islam, but not mention jihad so as not to appear too radical.27
However, counterterrorist groups have used the internet to exploit ideological weaknesses
in an attempt to discredit terrorists’ ideologies by separating face from “interpretation.” Public
response to propaganda is something to be weighed heavily for those involved in conflict during fourthgeneration warfare. In the case of al-Qaeda, even those that were previously affiliated with the organization are publicly criticizing the actions of the group— something that can prove to be detrimental for the survival of propaganda and recruitment efforts. For
example, in 2007, Saudi Arabia’s top cleris, Grand Mufti Sheik Abdul Aziz al-Asheik, attempted to deter Saudis from participating in jihadist activities in Iraq. Similar efforts were made by Abdul Aziz, a former leader in violent Islamic movements in Egypt, as well as Pakistani scholar Maulana Hassan Jan. Both denounced violent pro-Islamic actions by noting that they went directly against the ideologies of the religion.28 These differences forced al-Qaeda to defend its own actions using their interpretation
of religious documents.

Countries like the United States recognized a need to engage their enemy in regards to information sharing. In 2002, then- Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made efforts to establish the Office of  Strategic Information. One mission of this office was to streamline the release of information to the media (with the goal of influencing foreign audience’s perception of the United States).

However, due to laws such as the Smith-Mundt Act, the office was dismantled, as it was considered to some as a violation of the US’s stance against issuing propaganda to its citizens. Instead, strategic communication was undertaken by multiple parties within the US government, including the White House, State Department, Defense Department, and the National Counterterrorism Center’s Extremist Messaging Branch.29 Today, the terrorist group ISIS initiates a large portion of online recruiting. Reports have shown cases of girls, even in Western nations, leaving their homes to establish a new life with ISIS.


CBS reports that there are at least 500 UK citizens fighting in Syria and Iraq for ISIS, and every week, at least five new UK citizens join the fight.30 In this case, the recruitment is not only online, but effectively reaching major British cities, with ISIS members holding recruitment events aimed to convince practicing Muslims to embrace an idealistic Islamic Utopia. Most shocking are the reports of young teenage girls leaving their homes to become the brides of extremists; they are a target demographic due to their impressionable age.31 The majority of these interactions occur online on websites such as Twitter.
 Recruiters will spend hours with prospective recruits in order to connect with them on a personal level, to understand their current lifestyle, and then try to insert extremist beliefs into their daily life. Mubin Shaikh, a former recruiter for an extremist Islamic group, explained “We look for people who are isolated,” he said. “And if they are not isolated already, then we isolated them.”32 This makes full conversion to extremist beliefs faster and easier. Recruiters also will send packages with gifts to aid in their conversion, including chocolates and cards. For ISIS, social media is not only a recruiting mechanism, but also a method of “cheerleading for attacks without engaging in secret training.” or grassroots campaigning. For example, Elton Simpson, an ISIS supporter, encouraged others to  follow an ISIS leader on Twitter before opening fire with an assault rifle into a Texas crowd.33 Recruiters do not solely target those that can join in the physical fight, but also those with technology and management skills, emphasizing that any talent can help their cause to expand and thrive.34

Due to the constant evolution of warfare and the debate over its definition, there has been very limited widespread international action to monitor and regulate fourth-generation warfare. The UN Security Council has been responsible for most of the relevant legislation. It should be noted that while the body cannot directly change the minds or influence insurgents or counterinsurgents, it can regulate international response and procedure.

In December 2001, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established by Resolution 1386 of the United Nations Security Council. The purpose was to protect and assist Afghan National Security Forces in the conflict with the Taliban, as well as to try to assist Afghanistan in protecting and rebuilding components of their governmental institutions. Direct protection came in the form of troops from the United States, the United Kingdom, and other NATO members, with gradual transition of operations to Afghan forces over the years. The goal was to increase overall national security, to ensure that Afghanistan would not again become a breeding ground for terrorism.
In December 2014, the operation was disbanded and transitioned into an advisory role.35
In early 2015, Chad requested endorsement from the UNSC for a multinational task force to
protect itself against the insurgency of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria. The task force, consisting of troops from Chad, Cameroon, Libya, Niger, and Nigeria, would be headquartered in Baga. It would conduct military operations against arms dealers and suspected terrorists to help facilitate free movement in Lake Chad area.36 This was a direct response to the growing number of cross-border attacks around Nigeria, a noteworthy example of fourth-generation warfare.

In September 2014, United States President Barack Obama led the United Nations Security
Council in passing a resolution to limit the mobility of foreign fighters in an effort to specifically combat ISIS. The US proposed a four point strategy that they pushed to include in the resolution. First, it aimed to create new binding legal obligations for countries to expand on the original 2001 resolution,1373. It called on them to prevent foreign fighters from crossing their borders and asking them to rewrite their domestic laws to make traveling to join a terrorist group — or funding or sponsoring people with that goal — illegal. Second, it laid out a new information-sharing program to allow countries to share effective practices on how to counter the threat of foreign fighters.
Third, it sought to build out the mandates of several U.N. bodies to allow them to get involved in tracking how well the resolution was being implemented. Finally, the draft would compel states to institute their own countering violent-extremism (CVE) programs, working with communities to prevent people from wanting to join ISIS and other groups and rehabilitating them should they become radicalized.37 The resolution also defined what a “foreign terrorist fighter” was under international law for the first time, describing the term as “namely individuals who travel to a state other than their states of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict

Analysis
It is important to note that terrorism and terrorist groups are not defining elements, or characteristics of, fourth-generation warfare. Instead, many cases of fourth-generation warfare in the modern era include terrorist groups as insurgents. When considering the situation and dealings of fourth-generation warfare, it is not limited to terrorist operations; issues of
terrorism have been at the forefront of the transition, however, particularly in the Middle East.
To properly deal with issues associated with fourth generation warfare, and to dominate the actual battle, significant costs that were not relevant in the past have become pertinent in the present. Spending has included reinforcing cyber security to protect vital infrastructure, diplomacy, foreign assistance, strategic communications, and other instruments of
national security. Successful insurgents recognize the notion that political or economic paralysis of a nation can have broader-reaching effects than those of a more direct attack. For example, security instability has a direct effect on the ability to receive loans to help develop the nation. Even a threat could impact the financial health of a nation, as evidenced by Muqtada al-Sadr’s militia in southern Iraq, which specifically targeted oil production infrastructure. This was also seen in Nigeria, with rebels threatening future attacks on the oil industry to disrupt the nation’s oil output; the intent was to cripple the Nigerian economy, thus placing the government in a compromised state.39 With the onset of globalization, the potential effects of a
simple attack could have devastating, far-reaching consequences.

A particular challenge, especially in regards to this body, is that geographical sovereignty is not
a contingent factor in fourth-generation warfare.40 Therefore, it is incredibly difficult for world powers to establish control over military situations and provide guidance and standards in their operations.

Although there has been an increase in activity from groups like the United Nations, the European Union, and the Organization of American States, these organizations have very limited capabilities to effectively counter subnational extremist groups.41 Furthermore, globalization has weakened the ability of states to act as fully separate and sovereign entities.
Additionally, nationalism and patriotism have been trending downward worldwide, allowing individuals to more easily identify with subnational groups. As the world has become increasingly interconnected, many of these subnational groups have expanded to
become transnational groups. When the operations of counter-groups extend over multiple borders, organizational attack strategies become much more difficult.42


A different type of force is needed in the fourth generation. There needs to be less of an
emphasis on order and more of an emphasis on mobility. In order to have flexibility to make quick, reactionary decisions, units should not be at the mercy of decision-makers.43 A major issue for troops in nations like the United States is resistance to changing strategies and tactics due to prior successes. Other groups are less hampered by convention, allowing them to be innovative and speedy in their battle tactics.
 The Vietnam War is one major example of a superpower like the United States failing to fully adapt the innovative tactics of guerrilla warfare, and suffering major political repercussions as a result. Having to adjust to the new military tactics of their opponents, the US struggled to achieve clearly defined “wins” in battle.
 Leaders in Vietnam reached out to popular groups within the US, such as Vietnam Veterans against the War and international charities, to try to spur a shift in American public opinion. Vietnam also used the media and other international networks to turn the Tet Offensive into a strategic move that would ultimately force the United States to withdraw troops. Leaders in Vietnam understood that political and public support could tip the balance of the war in their favor. Fourth-generation warfare has opened the door for dramatic shifts in political thought, and has contributed to interrupting the political balance in various regions. Additionally, although many means of fourth-generation warfare are supported or created by non-military technology, new techniques have still resulted in numerous casualties. Due to the magnitude of these consequences, fourth-generation warfare should be monitored and, potentially, regulated.44

Possible Solutions
Utilizing the Media
The media, particularly when dealing with terrorist groups, could be used to portray counterterrorist groups’ ideologies in a favorable light. For example, in their involvement in Iraq,
the US Department of Defense spent close to $300 million to help private contractors produce news stories, entertainment programs, and PSAs for Iraqi media. The ultimate goal was to “engage and inspire” the local population to support the Iraqi government.45 These efforts praised the Iraqi military, showcased improvements in government services, and encouraged Iraqi citizens to report criminal activity. This type of strategy is very important in fourth-generation warfare, especially given the dispersed nature of battle as well as the conditions surrounding both foreign and local troops.
As previously noted, the line between citizen and military is blurred, rendering local civilians as
useful weapons. One should keep in mind the ethics involved with this, and specific boundaries that would need to be set. According to terrorism expert Martha Crenshaw, a government’s counterterrorism message must not only serve to reduce the probability of violence, but it must also promote internal group dissension, and increase opportunities to exit the terrorist group.46 This goes hand in hand with the core notion of fourth-generation warfare – moving away from a purely militaristic approach, and moving toward attacking the cohesion of the counter group to destroy it from within.


Reforming Social Media
With today’s technology it is easier than ever for insurgent groups to communicate with one
another, as well as to recruit new members. There is no reason that Facebook and Twitter should be such accessible tools for seditious organizations. Considering that prospective recruits can discover extremists with ease, the uninterrupted operation of these social media accounts should be reevaluated.
Although it would be very easy for insurgent groups to recreate their accounts, the disabling of the social media pages should be highly considered. The recruitment advances of extremist groups should be taken very seriously, as they not only increase the size and skill-level of these non-state actors, but they allow these groups to infiltrate the populations of their enemies. This serves to enhance the fourth generation warfare strategy of extremist organizations: “destroying from within.” Weakening insurgent groups’ access to social media is key to destabilizing their core warfare strategies.

Military and Civilian Task Forces
Another consideration is task force groups similar to the one in the Lake Chad region. Since
fourth-generation warfare is often not contained within state borders, and is therefore very
multinational in nature, cooperation to contain insurgent groups is essential. This is especially true for states that directly border the affected region.These task forces allow for the sharing of strategies and resources as nations continue to develop and update their warfare tactics. Endorsed task force groups also benefit from the resources of much larger groups like the United Nations.

Bloc Positions
Asia
Although they have taken a stance of nonintervention in other nations’ internal affairs, the
Chinese consider the protection of their trade an important component of their national security. Their major focus is on how other major economies coul interdict their flow of goods.47 Although Russia disagrees with many other nations, particularly the United States, on how to intervene in the Middle East, it does recognize the importance of controlling the conflict with extremist groups.48 Other Asian nations such as Japan have practiced pacifism in the fight against extremists, despite having citizens being held hostage.49

North America, Europe, and Australia
These nations have been most active and successful in counter-insurgent efforts, most notably
led by the United States. They are determined to  protect their national and international ideologies have remained intact for centuries. However, these nations are also former superpowers that have not traditionally faced the challenges of transitioning generational warfare as much as in the fourth generation. Even so, the nations have relied heavily on their intelligence operations and special forces to combat non-state actors. Furthermore, the number of foreigners participating in ISIS activities has doubled since December 2013, with France, the UK, and Germany producing the highest numbers of fighters.50 Decreasing the number of recruits to
insurgent group remain a top priority, along with halting the spread of extremist beliefs.

The Middle East
This region is in the most crucial area for fourthgeneration warfare. Each nation can be considered individually for its beliefs and value to the fourth generation warfare discussion. Syria is a hub for extremist insurgent groups, and is a major destination for foreigners looking to join the extremist cause. Turkey, although not directly related to extremist groups, is a country in which many foreign fighters pass through to get to extremist non-state actors, making its border essential to control warfare.51

Questions a Resolution Must Answer
1. Within at-risk regions, how can state powers create or maintain stable governments (whether provisional or not) to protect against insurgency?
2. With media influence being a “weapon” in war, how can this body protect the integrity
of media reporting?
3. What measures can be taken to transition and train local troops within nation-states
of conflict?
4. How can the UN regulate or control the number of foreigners crossing borders to join conflict, particularly in regards to social media?
5. How can the UN control potentially dangerous online recruiting efforts by
insurgent groups?
6. Since fourth generation warfare is often not contained within state borders, what
measures can be taken to assist neighboring states in times of conflict?
7. In what capacity can UN peacekeeping efforts be used and how can these efforts
become more efficient in the evolution of war tactics?
8. How can the militaries of multiple nations effectively integrate with one to combat
non-state actors?
9. How can local civilians be protected from the social factors of fourth generation war
in their regions?
10. How can these solutions be tailored to Middle East groups specifically?

Conclusion
The transition into fourth-generation warfare is must now adjust and adapt to the new front. With the repercussions of fourth generation warfare coming under scrutiny of the public eye, it is up to the United Nations, and more specifically, the Disarmament and International Security Committee, to find a resolution to properly address all the nuanced issues that come with finding a stable and lasting peace in this new realm of warfare.