AGENDA: FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Introduction to the Body
Welcome to the Disarmament and International Security
Committee (DISEC)! Formally known as “The First Committee of the General
Assembly,” DISEC is in charge of the establishment and
maintenance of international peace and
security. As the First Committee, DISEC is often tasked with solving the
world’s most important problems. The committee is composed of representatives
from all member states of the United Nations, who are each given one vote to
emphasize equality in all decisions. Its mandate, stated clearly in Article 26
of the United Nations Charter, is to “promote
the establishment and maintenance of international
peace and security with the least diversion.”
DISEC discusses topics such as arms control, conflict resolution, and nuclear
disarmament. However, due to constantly evolving technology, the content discussed
in committee is rapidly expanding into new topics such as cyber warfare. Unlike
the Security Council (UNSC), DISEC is not allowed to impose any kind of
sanctions on a nation, nor can it dictate a member’s actions.
Under these restrictions, DISEC constitutes a
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when dealing with issues of extreme importance.
Debating the topics at hand, you will have the
opportunity to propose and fine-tune your
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Please use this background guide as a beginning
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critically about big picture problems.
Statement of the
Issue
Fourth-generation warfare is often initiated
by
the “weaker” party, or the group with less
traditional resources and power. This new form of warfare often has major
similarities with traditional low-intensity conflict, particularly in regards
to guerrilla warfare tactics. Fourth-generation warfare proves to be
detrimental to international cooperation efforts, as it is often characterized
by violent non-state actors
that act in a similar role to traditional
states. While some of the motivations and rationale
have remained consistent throughout the
evolution of warfare, tactics have changed drastically in response to today’s
environment. Often executed by non-state parties that lack a center of political
gravity, fourth generation warfare is highly motivated by religion,
nationalism, and family honor. Insurgency on political, social, and economic
fronts has become a powerful weapon in today’s evolving concept of war.
Furthermore, fourth-generation warfare can include
cyber terrorism in cases of state-to-state
conflict. When escalated, cyber terrorism can greatly impact the safety,
quality of life, and privacy of civilians.
Experts
describe this new “fourth generation” as being widely dispersed and difficult
to define, leading to new challenges on how to guide international warfare
standards. It is imperative to identify these generational changes, in hopes of
avoiding catastrophic civilian consequences.
History
Before delving into the history of fourth
generation warfare, it is important to note the
line of progress of modern warfare throughout
the “generations,” or qualitative shifts of both
technology and ideas.
First Generation
War experts define first generation warfare as
tactics of “line and column and man power”
The line maximized firepower, given the
weapons of the time and column response to the low training levels of troops.3 Hierarchy and discipline
among soldiers was emphasized in top-down, tightly ordered structures. In this
generation, distinguishing factors such as a strong culture, uniforms, and rank
clearly separated the military from civilians. Lind describes this generation
of warfare as emerging during the Thirty Year’s War, as the challenges of the
time forced the states to organize and conduct their own troops in order to
protect the wellbeing
of the state. Previously, warfare was
conducted on a much smaller scale (i.e. by families, tribes, religious groups,
etc.). Over time, and notably with the Peace of Westphalia, the state
established a virtual monopoly on warfare activities.4 The first generation of war also created a distinction by
highlighting the use of military force through armies and navies, and
deemphasizing tactics like bribery and assassination. Direct line of fire was
also a commonly used method of conducting war.
Second
Generation
The second generation of warfare developed in
the early stages of World War I, and put a greater emphasis on firepower and
weapons than on sheer manpower. The transition stemmed from the development of
weapons like machine guns, which made the first generation methods of war
effectively obsolete. Furthermore, weapon technology was developed on a massive
scale by the industrialized economies of individual states. With this, a new
method of war emerged: the battle of warfare materials.5
Most notably, WWI saw the first instances of
indirect, linear fire and movement. The defensive
methods put a focus on laterally dispersed
line advances, with execution by small groups.6
However, it is important to note that an
emphasis on order within the military still remained, particularly in regards
to formation. The goal of this generation was attrition; as described by the French,
“the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies.”7 This created firepower that was synchronized and plan oriented.
Soldiers also welcomed an emphasis on order because it preserved the culture of
discipline and even with the evolution of war.
Third Generation
Developed by the Germans
during the end of WWI, the third generation of warfare placed and emphasis on
using distance and depth between troops as a method of defense and strategy. Thus, this
generation was the first to utilize truly nonlinear tactics. Additionally,
armies put a strong emphasis on tactics of infiltration to bypass and collapse
its
enemy. This also created a shift in military
culture from outward (focused on the situation and enemy) to inward (focused on
the process and method). Orders emphasized the ends, but not necessarily the means,
creating a culture that valued initiative as
much as obedience. Technological progress came
in the development of tanks. Technological change also created an operational
shift, most famously in the form of blitzkrieg. Blitzkrieg took the main
objective from place to time while emphasizing qualitative maneuvers over
quantitative fire; it drastically shortened the decision making window of
opponents.
As is evident in earlier generational shifts,
evolution is driven by growing emphases on and
development of a few key ideas. Trends through
the generational shifts have shown four consistent drivers of change. The first
is the evolution of mission orders, with each generation becoming more and more
disperse on the battlefield, and efforts becoming increasingly divided into
smaller groups for greater flexibility in attacks. Another driver is the
decreasing dependence on centralized logistics. This allows troops to put more
emphasis on time, and possess a greater ability to live off the land of the
enemy. The next driver is an emphasis on maneuvers. This puts less importance
on sheer number of the troops, and more importance of smaller groups. These
groups are harder to detect and are highly adaptive. The last driver is the
shift in focus toward the enemy’s internal operations. This particular shift is
very important in the transition from third to fourth generations. It
illustrates the growing importance of understanding the strategic
centers of an opponent, and gaining the
support of the people in these centers.9
Throughout the history of war, three elements
have remained consistent. According to Professor
Martin van Creveld, there is a “holy trinity”
of Western war-making, consisting of the state, the people, and the army.10 Fourth-generation warfare
blurs the distinctions between these three. The use of fourth-generation-like
warfare can be traced back to the Cold War. In this time period, there was less
emphasis on traditional forms of war such as linear fire, bombers, machine
guns, etc., and more emphasis on “war” through colonization. Major powers
turned their focus to acquiring and maintaining colonies that would practice
their ideologies. The most notable executor of this strategy was, of course,
the Soviet Union, with its Soviet satellite states. The Cold war saw the
dissemination of widespread propaganda, secrecy and the creation of fear among
citizens to be used as a force against opposing powers. Since battlefields in
their traditional forms did not exist, public opinion became essential. When
the Soviet Union collapsed, so did the realistic possibility of another nation
challenging the United States in conventional conflict. Thus, the concept of
fourth-generation warfare evolved further.12 Unconventional war has proven to be very effective in combating
established powers worldwide, most notably in the Iranian revolution, the
Hezbollah campaign in South Lebanon, the Algerian war of Independence, and the
Sandinista struggle in Nicaragua. Regardless of whether the insurgents achieve
a true “victory,” unconventional warfare has proven to be a major
catalyst for political, economic, and social
change in the territories involved.13
Current
Situation and relevant International Action
The theory of
fourth generation warfare can be tracked to the 1980’s work of
William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightingale, Captain John F.Schmitt, Colonel Joseph W. Sutton, and
Lieutenant Col Gary I. Wilson in the Marine Corps Gazette.14The primary tenet is a
return to the world of cultures, and
not necessarily that of specific states in conflict. This ultimately leads to a crisis for countries like the United States, in determining the legitimacy
of the state. In some cases, when counter
insurgencies are
led by foreign troops, it
makes the state’s crisis of
legitimacy much worse.15 The fourth generation of warfare creates a “new class of
international force”- the non-state actor.16 With the state losing the monopoly on war, the road is paved for
groups such as Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, Hamas, and Hezbollah to exercise great
influence. The violent nonstate actors (VNSAs)17 are able to act with great mobility, as they are not concerned
with protecting their territory, but rather are primarily interested in
spreading their respective ideologies. Because of the methods involved in
fourth generation warfare some experts say that traditional superpowers are
actually at a disadvantage on operational, strategic, mental and even moral
levels. There is a heightened emphasis on concurrent actions within both the
opponent’s physical and societal entities, coupled with the blurring of
distinctions between military members and civilians.
Additionally, elements that gave superpowers
advantages in past generations, such as large
headquarters for troops and fixed
communication sites, have become obsolete, and even detriments, to the needs of
fourth generation battle. These features create too great of a risk to the
total functionality of the mission within the scope of these warfare
developments. Guerrilla warfare of any kind prevents the possibility of
striking an opponent’s
headquarters, forcing countries to rethink
previously successful wartime strategies. Former superpowers, however, have
struggled with this new system, most notably the US and France in Vietnam, and
the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.19 With
fourth generation warfare, the key is to “apply force to an enemy without
giving him a point at which to carry out a decisive counter-strike.”20 This viewpoint is
radically different from the traditional approaches of major European powers
and the United States, forcing these states to adopt new war philosophies,
and defend against evolving types of combat.
The development of technology is both an asset and a liability in
fourth-generation warfare.
Advancements in robotics, artificial
intelligence, and drones allow for more developed war tactics, potentially
leaving enemies crippled. However, these weapons have had challenges in combat,
as they are easy to counter and are often too complex. Because of the precision
that today’s technology allows, especially from remote locations, target
selection has become much more important to isolate the enemy. A key to success
in fourth-generation warfare could be “losing to win.” The West has been at the
center of warfare for centuries, because the rest of the world has been forced
to adopt their strategies to fight effectively. Recently, a monumental shift
has taken place. Terrorism is much more about where and when to execute an
attack, while utilizing relatively little firepower. Terrorists have been
successful in the past by attempting to collapse target-states from within,
using a state’s freedom and openness against itself to wage an ideological
battle.
Major powers have faced challenges when
occupying territories in which much of the
population resists occupation. This was most
notably seen in the United States’ involvement in
Iraq and Afghanistan. It is widely believed
that the US inadvertently created a breeding ground for terrorists and opened
the door for fourth-generation warfare by establishing a declining, relatively
weak Afghani state.21
To be successful, many experts say that
superpowers must learn to fight “battles of
encirclement,” by having an infantry that can
move farther and faster on foot than the enemy’s. Another strategy is
attempting to assimilate into local cultures preserve the current state,
notably attempted in the US conflicts with Iraq and Afghanistan. Subnational
groups are in a particularly interesting position, as they can either be enemies
or allies to established powers within a region. They can demonstrate
allegiance to whichever party appeases them, thus putting them in a position of
flexibility and dangerous ambiguity. Furthermore, terrorist groups deemphasize
the power of order to help improve their speed and flexibility in attack. Even
the defining factors of fourth-generation warfare are still evolving in the
present day. For example, Thomas Hammes recently noted that “insurgent
campaigns have shifted from military campaigns supported by information
operations to strategic communications campaigns supported by guerrilla and
terrorist operations.”22
Case Study:
Recruitment for Al-Qaeda and ISIS
Al-Qaeda was one of the first to implement online
terrorist activity in the form of propaganda, military instruction videos, and
other informational videos. This is considered a form of low-intensity military
effort referred to as “netwar.” 23 Notably,
these materials are translated into multiple languages to reach a larger
audience. Extremist groups have used platforms such as blogs, message boards,
and email as sources for quick dispersion of materials
and indoctrination, with some groups even
creating “social media like hubs for extremists intent on becoming the next
generation of terrorists, hijackers, and even suicide bombers.”24 These materials have been
coined as “bedroom jihad” by war analysts due to their easy accessibility and
integration into potential recruits’ lives.25 Many groups have compiled data on individuals to facilitate
recruitment, which is a necessity for the sustainability of their respective
movements. al-Qaeda in particular had become so good at their online
propaganda, that former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted “It is
embarrassing that al-Qaeda is better at communicating its message on the
Internet than America…speed, agility, and cultural relevance are not terms that
come readily to mind when discussing US strategic communications.”26 In 2009, a copy of A
Course in the Art of Recruiting was recovered by United States in Iraq. The
pamphlet went into
detail about strategies for the recruitment of
new al-Qaeda members, particularly foreigners. A key strategy was to spend as
much time with, and listen carefully to, a prospective recruit to understand
their life and “share his joys and sadness.” The pamphlet also instructed
recruiters to instill the basics of Islam, but not mention jihad so as not to
appear too radical.27
However, counterterrorist groups have used the
internet to exploit ideological weaknesses
in an attempt to discredit terrorists’
ideologies by separating face from “interpretation.” Public
response to propaganda is something to be
weighed heavily for those involved in conflict during fourthgeneration warfare.
In the case of al-Qaeda, even those that were previously affiliated with the
organization are publicly criticizing the actions of the group— something that
can prove to be detrimental for the survival of propaganda and recruitment
efforts. For
example, in 2007, Saudi Arabia’s top cleris, Grand
Mufti Sheik Abdul Aziz al-Asheik, attempted to deter Saudis from participating
in jihadist activities in Iraq. Similar efforts were made by Abdul Aziz, a
former leader in violent Islamic movements in Egypt, as well as Pakistani
scholar Maulana Hassan Jan. Both denounced violent pro-Islamic actions by noting
that they went directly against the ideologies of the religion.28 These differences forced
al-Qaeda to defend its own actions using their interpretation
of religious documents.
Countries like the United States recognized a need
to engage their enemy in regards to information sharing. In 2002, then-
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made efforts to establish the Office of Strategic Information. One mission of this
office was to streamline the release of information to the media (with the goal
of influencing foreign audience’s perception of the United States).
However, due to laws such as the Smith-Mundt
Act, the office was dismantled, as it was considered to some as a violation of
the US’s stance against issuing propaganda to its citizens. Instead, strategic
communication was undertaken by multiple parties within the US government,
including the White House, State Department, Defense Department, and the
National Counterterrorism Center’s Extremist Messaging Branch.29 Today, the terrorist
group ISIS initiates a large portion
of online recruiting. Reports have shown cases of girls, even in Western nations, leaving their homes to establish a new life with ISIS.
CBS reports that there are at least 500 UK
citizens fighting in Syria and Iraq for ISIS, and every week, at least five new
UK citizens join the fight.30 In
this case, the recruitment is not only online, but effectively reaching major
British cities, with ISIS members holding recruitment events aimed to convince practicing
Muslims to embrace an idealistic Islamic Utopia. Most shocking are the reports
of young teenage girls leaving their homes to become the brides of extremists;
they are a target demographic due to their impressionable age.31 The majority of these
interactions occur online on websites such as Twitter.
Recruiters will spend hours with prospective recruits
in order to connect with them on a personal level, to understand their current lifestyle, and then try to
insert extremist beliefs into their daily life. Mubin Shaikh, a former
recruiter for an extremist Islamic group, explained “We look for people who are
isolated,” he said. “And if they are not isolated already, then we isolated
them.”32 This makes full conversion
to extremist beliefs faster and easier. Recruiters also will send packages with
gifts to aid in their conversion, including chocolates and cards. For ISIS, social media is not only a
recruiting mechanism, but also a method of “cheerleading for attacks without
engaging in secret training.” or grassroots campaigning. For example, Elton Simpson,
an ISIS supporter, encouraged others to follow
an ISIS leader on Twitter before opening fire with an assault rifle into a
Texas crowd.33 Recruiters do not solely
target those that can join in the physical fight, but also those with
technology and management skills, emphasizing that any talent can help their
cause to expand and thrive.34
Due to the constant evolution of warfare and the
debate over its definition, there has been very limited widespread
international action to monitor and regulate fourth-generation warfare. The UN Security
Council has been responsible for most of the relevant legislation. It should be
noted that while the body cannot directly change the minds or influence
insurgents or counterinsurgents, it can regulate international response and
procedure.
In December 2001, the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) was established by Resolution 1386 of the United Nations Security Council.
The purpose was to protect and assist Afghan National Security Forces in the
conflict with the Taliban, as well as to try to assist Afghanistan in
protecting and rebuilding components of their governmental institutions. Direct
protection came in the form of troops from the United States, the United
Kingdom, and other NATO members, with gradual transition of operations to
Afghan forces over the years. The goal was to increase overall national
security, to ensure that Afghanistan would not again become a breeding ground
for terrorism.
In December 2014, the operation was disbanded
and transitioned into an advisory role.35
In early 2015, Chad requested endorsement from
the UNSC for a multinational task force to
protect itself against the insurgency of Boko
Haram in northern Nigeria. The task force, consisting of troops from Chad,
Cameroon, Libya, Niger, and Nigeria, would be headquartered in Baga. It would conduct
military operations against arms dealers and suspected terrorists to help
facilitate free movement in Lake Chad area.36 This was a direct response to the growing number of cross-border
attacks around Nigeria, a noteworthy example of fourth-generation warfare.
In September 2014, United States President Barack
Obama led the United Nations Security
Council in passing a resolution to limit the
mobility of foreign fighters in an effort to specifically combat ISIS. The US
proposed a four point strategy that they pushed to include in the resolution.
First, it aimed to create new binding legal obligations for countries to expand
on the original 2001 resolution,1373. It called on them to prevent foreign
fighters from crossing their borders and asking them to rewrite their domestic
laws to make traveling to join a terrorist group — or funding or sponsoring
people with that goal — illegal. Second, it laid out a new information-sharing
program to allow countries to share effective practices on how to counter the
threat of foreign fighters.
Third, it sought to build out the mandates of
several U.N. bodies to allow them to get involved in tracking how well the
resolution was being implemented. Finally, the draft would compel states to
institute their own countering violent-extremism (CVE) programs, working with communities
to prevent people from wanting to join ISIS and other groups and rehabilitating
them should they become radicalized.37 The
resolution also defined what a “foreign terrorist fighter” was under
international law for the first time, describing the term as “namely individuals
who travel to a state other than their states of residence or nationality for
the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation
in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training,
including in connection with armed conflict
Analysis
It is important to note that terrorism and
terrorist groups are not defining elements, or characteristics of,
fourth-generation warfare. Instead, many cases of fourth-generation warfare in
the modern era include terrorist groups as insurgents. When considering the
situation and dealings of fourth-generation warfare, it is not limited to
terrorist operations; issues of
terrorism have been at the forefront of the
transition, however, particularly in the Middle East.
To properly deal with issues associated with fourth
generation warfare, and to dominate the actual battle, significant costs that
were not relevant in the past have become pertinent in the present. Spending has
included reinforcing cyber security to protect vital infrastructure, diplomacy,
foreign assistance, strategic communications, and other instruments of
national security. Successful insurgents
recognize the notion that political or economic paralysis of a nation can have
broader-reaching effects than those of a more direct attack. For example, security
instability has a direct effect on the ability to receive loans to help develop
the nation. Even a threat could impact the financial health of a nation, as evidenced
by Muqtada al-Sadr’s militia in southern Iraq, which specifically targeted oil
production infrastructure. This was also seen in Nigeria, with rebels
threatening future attacks on the oil industry to disrupt the nation’s oil
output; the intent was to cripple the Nigerian economy, thus placing the government
in a compromised state.39 With
the onset of globalization, the potential effects of a
simple attack could have devastating,
far-reaching consequences.
A particular challenge, especially in regards to
this body, is that geographical sovereignty is not
a contingent factor in fourth-generation
warfare.40 Therefore, it is
incredibly difficult for world powers to
establish control over military situations and provide guidance and standards
in their operations.
Although there has been an increase in
activity from groups like the United Nations, the European Union, and the
Organization of American States, these organizations have very limited
capabilities to effectively counter subnational extremist groups.41 Furthermore,
globalization has weakened the ability of states to act as fully separate and
sovereign entities.
Additionally, nationalism and patriotism have
been trending downward worldwide, allowing individuals to more easily identify
with subnational groups. As the world has become increasingly interconnected, many
of these subnational groups have expanded to
become transnational groups. When the
operations of counter-groups extend over multiple borders, organizational
attack strategies become much more difficult.42
A different type of force is needed in the fourth
generation. There needs to be less of an
emphasis on order and more of an emphasis on mobility.
In order to have flexibility to make quick, reactionary decisions, units should
not be at the mercy of decision-makers.43 A major issue for troops in nations like the United States is
resistance to changing strategies and tactics due to prior successes. Other
groups are less hampered by convention, allowing them to be innovative and
speedy in their battle tactics.
The
Vietnam War is one major example of a superpower like the United States failing
to fully adapt the innovative tactics of guerrilla warfare, and suffering major
political repercussions as a result. Having to adjust to the new military
tactics of their opponents, the US struggled to achieve clearly defined “wins”
in battle.
Leaders
in Vietnam reached out to popular groups within the US, such as Vietnam Veterans
against the War and international charities, to try to spur a shift in American
public opinion. Vietnam also used the media and other international networks to
turn the Tet Offensive into a strategic move that would ultimately force the
United States to withdraw troops. Leaders in Vietnam understood that political
and public support could tip the balance of the war in their favor. Fourth-generation
warfare has opened the door for dramatic shifts in political thought, and has
contributed to interrupting the political balance in various regions.
Additionally, although many means of fourth-generation warfare are supported or
created by non-military technology, new techniques have still resulted in numerous
casualties. Due to the magnitude of these consequences, fourth-generation warfare
should be monitored and, potentially, regulated.44
Possible Solutions
Utilizing the
Media
The media, particularly when dealing with
terrorist groups, could be used to portray counterterrorist groups’ ideologies
in a favorable light. For example, in their involvement in Iraq,
the US Department of Defense spent close to $300
million to help private contractors produce news stories, entertainment
programs, and PSAs for Iraqi media. The ultimate goal was to “engage and
inspire” the local population to support the Iraqi government.45 These efforts praised the
Iraqi military, showcased improvements in government services, and encouraged
Iraqi citizens to report criminal activity. This type of strategy is very important
in fourth-generation warfare, especially given the dispersed nature of battle
as well as the conditions surrounding both foreign and local troops.
As previously noted, the line between citizen and
military is blurred, rendering local civilians as
useful weapons. One should keep in mind the
ethics involved with this, and specific boundaries that would need to be set.
According to terrorism expert Martha Crenshaw, a government’s counterterrorism message
must not only serve to reduce the probability of violence, but it must also
promote internal group dissension, and increase opportunities to exit the terrorist
group.46 This goes hand in hand
with the core notion of fourth-generation warfare – moving away from a purely
militaristic approach, and moving toward attacking the cohesion of the counter group
to destroy it from within.
Reforming Social
Media
With today’s technology it is easier than ever
for insurgent groups to communicate with one
another, as well as to recruit new members.
There is no reason that Facebook and Twitter should be such accessible tools
for seditious organizations. Considering that prospective recruits can discover
extremists with ease, the uninterrupted operation of these social media accounts
should be reevaluated.
Although it would be very easy for insurgent
groups to recreate their accounts, the disabling of the social media pages
should be highly considered. The recruitment advances of extremist groups should
be taken very seriously, as they not only increase the size and skill-level of
these non-state actors, but they allow these groups to infiltrate the populations
of their enemies. This serves to enhance the fourth generation warfare strategy
of extremist organizations: “destroying from within.” Weakening insurgent
groups’ access to social media is key to destabilizing their core warfare
strategies.
Military and
Civilian Task Forces
Another consideration is task force groups similar
to the one in the Lake Chad region. Since
fourth-generation warfare is often not contained
within state borders, and is therefore very
multinational in nature, cooperation to
contain insurgent groups is essential. This is especially true for states that
directly border the affected region.These task forces allow for the sharing of
strategies and resources as nations continue to develop and update their warfare
tactics. Endorsed task force groups also benefit from the resources of much larger
groups like the United Nations.
Bloc Positions
Asia
Although they have taken a stance of
nonintervention in other nations’ internal affairs, the
Chinese consider the protection of their trade
an important component of their national security. Their major focus is on how
other major economies coul interdict their flow of goods.47 Although Russia disagrees
with many other nations, particularly the United States, on how to intervene in
the Middle East, it does recognize the importance of controlling the conflict
with extremist groups.48 Other
Asian nations such as Japan have practiced pacifism in the fight against
extremists, despite having citizens being held hostage.49
North America,
Europe, and Australia
These nations have been most active and successful
in counter-insurgent efforts, most notably
led by the United States. They are determined
to protect their national and
international ideologies have remained intact for centuries. However, these
nations are also former superpowers that have not traditionally faced the
challenges of transitioning generational warfare as much as in the fourth
generation. Even so, the nations have relied heavily on their intelligence
operations and special forces to combat non-state actors. Furthermore, the number
of foreigners participating in ISIS activities has doubled since December 2013,
with France, the UK, and Germany producing the highest numbers of fighters.50 Decreasing the number of
recruits to
insurgent group remain a top priority, along
with halting the spread of extremist beliefs.
The Middle East
This region is in the most crucial area for
fourthgeneration warfare. Each nation can be considered individually for its beliefs
and value to the fourth generation warfare discussion. Syria is a hub for extremist
insurgent groups, and is a major destination for foreigners looking to join the
extremist cause. Turkey, although not directly related to extremist groups, is
a country in which many foreign fighters pass through to get to extremist
non-state actors, making its border essential to control warfare.51
Questions a
Resolution Must Answer
1. Within at-risk regions, how can state
powers create or maintain stable governments (whether provisional or not) to
protect against insurgency?
2. With media influence being a “weapon” in war,
how can this body protect the integrity
of media reporting?
3. What measures can be taken to transition and
train local troops within nation-states
of conflict?
4. How can the UN regulate or control the number
of foreigners crossing borders to join conflict, particularly in regards to social
media?
5. How can the UN control potentially dangerous
online recruiting efforts by
insurgent groups?
6. Since fourth generation warfare is often not
contained within state borders, what
measures can be taken to assist neighboring states
in times of conflict?
7. In what capacity can UN peacekeeping efforts
be used and how can these efforts
become more efficient in the evolution of war
tactics?
8. How can the militaries of multiple nations effectively
integrate with one to combat
non-state actors?
9. How can local civilians be protected from the
social factors of fourth generation war
in their regions?
10. How can these solutions be tailored to Middle
East groups specifically?
Conclusion
The transition into fourth-generation warfare
is must now adjust and adapt to the new front. With the repercussions of fourth
generation warfare coming under scrutiny of the public eye, it is up to the
United Nations, and more specifically, the Disarmament and International
Security Committee, to find a resolution to properly address all the nuanced
issues that come with finding a stable and lasting peace in this new realm of
warfare.
